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INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court was the original problem-solving court,
where the role of the judge was to be a leader of a team that in-
cluded other helping professionals, especially social workers and
probation officers, to address the underlying reasons that the child
was brought to court. The purpose was not so much to determine
innocence or guilt but to help the child who had gotten into
trouble through court-based interventions. While the Supreme
Court in 1967 ultimately determined that children brought to
court had due process rights that included the right to counsel, the
role of the court as a place to solve problems remains a central
tenet of this court system.1
As the juvenile court evolved into a family court where child
maltreatment was adjudicated separately from delinquency, the
core judge-driven and problem-solving model was applied to these
subsequent proceedings. What was best for the child permeated
the determinations of neglect or abuse even as the adjudication
process became more structured and adversarial. Nevertheless, un-
like the determination that children had a constitutional right to
† Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks
especially to Michele Cortese, Kara Finck, and Emma Ketteringham for assisting me
in this project. Thanks to Sarah Gledhill Deibler for her extraordinary research assis-
tance. This article is dedicated to Sue Jacobs, the founding Executive Director of the
Center for Family Representation.
1 In re Gault, 387 US 1, 41 (1967); Jane M. Spinak, Family Court, in THE CHILD: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION 344, 344-45 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2009).
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counsel in delinquency matters, the Supreme Court has never held
that parents have a concomitant right to counsel in child protective
proceedings or even in termination of parental rights cases, per-
haps the most drastic civil court outcome imaginable.2 Without this
constitutional mandate to provide counsel to indigent parents,
states were not compelled to develop effective family defense legal
practices and they did not. Even states, like New York, which statu-
torily require counsel for parents,3 never embraced an institutional
model of parental defense that mirrored either the institutional
criminal defense or child advocacy systems that were developed
and funded by state and county governments.4
Problem-solving courts began to flourish in the early 1990s
with the creation of criminal drug courts as alternatives to standard
criminal court practices.5 In the drug courts, defendants would re-
ceive treatment rather than incarceration and be monitored
closely within the court.6 Family Court Treatment Parts (FCTPs)
were developed in the late 1990s in New York State, fully embrac-
ing the three key components of the problem-solving drug court
model: (1) an activist judge who helps to fashion, and then closely
monitor, dispositions; (2) a team of lawyers, social workers, and
court personnel who try to identify and then work toward com-
mons goals with the family; and (3) frequent and meaningful court
appearances by relevant parties.7 This team model has, at various
times and in various FCTPs, challenged the attorneys for the par-
ents (and sometimes the child) in fulfilling several of their ethical
responsibilities to their clients, including preserving confidential-
ity, maintaining client-centered advocacy, and protecting due pro-
cess rights.8
2 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
3 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262 (McKinney 2012); see also infra text accompanying notes
33-35.
4 For example, the Legal Aid Society of New York has been the primary institu-
tional provider for criminal defense contracts with New York City since 1965. See Rob-
ert F. Wagner, Jr., Mayor, N.Y.C, Exec. Order No. 178 (1965). The Juvenile Rights
Division (now Juvenile Rights Practice) of the Legal Aid Society was established in
1962—concurrently with New York Family Courts—and began contracts with New
York State to represent children in child protective proceedings soon thereafter. See
Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 243, 245 (McKinney 2010);
see also FAM. CT. ACT § 248.
5 See Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to
Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2003).
6 Id. at 1506.
7 See infra Part III. I am using the term Family Court Treatment Part (FCTP).
These parts are also called Family Treatment Court or similar types of names. For
consistency, I will use only FCTP.
8 See infra Part III.
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In the last decade, New York City has embraced multi-discipli-
nary, institutional family defense practice by contracting with insti-
tutional providers to represent the vast majority of parents in child
welfare proceedings.9 The ability of these practitioners to improve
the process and outcomes for families has begun to be proven and
felt. Vigorous, sustained advocacy has challenged previous court
practices that often failed to protect the procedural and substan-
tive due process rights of parents and permitted often-unfettered
judicial discretion. Social work staff employed by these family de-
fense offices have proven just as adept at assisting parents in find-
ing and sustaining treatment as staff employed by the FCTPs.10 The
development of this advocacy also challenges the problem-solving
approach to resolving family concerns that characterizes the court
in general but especially in the FCTPs that have incorporated a
new generation of problem-solving court practices.
The rise of multi-disciplinary, institutional family defense prac-
tice has generated an unanticipated consequence: the diminish-
ment and even disappearance of FCTPs in New York City. While
the overall number of FCTPs has decreased in recent years across
New York State for several reasons, including the lack of resources
to sustain the courts, in New York City their disappearance can be
attributed in significant part to the development of rigorous family
defense practice where advocates counsel their clients about the
meaning and impact of FCTPs in far more informed and nuanced
ways and social work staff can effectively support parents address-
ing substance use.11 This essay traces the trajectory of both the
FCTPs and these practitioners to analyze this outcome. Part I in-
troduces the Family Court as a problem-solving court and includes
my concerns about the court as a place to solve problems. Part II
discusses the limits of parent representation through a discussion
of the Supreme Court decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Ser-
vices and subsequent litigation in challenging the effectiveness of
the assigned counsel system in New York. Part III discusses the cre-
ation of FCTPs in New York and Part IV reviews what is currently
known about the effectiveness of FCTPs. Part V traces the creation
of family defense practice in New York City and Part VI discusses
the impact that practice has had on FCTPs. Part VII discusses the
lessons that can be learned from the creation of an effective system
of parent representation.
9 See infra Part V.
10 See infra Part V.
11 See infra Part VI.
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I. FAMILY COURT AS PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT
The founders of the juvenile court movement believed that
the adversarial and punitive criminal court was unsuited to meet
the needs of the young people coming into the court.12 Rather,
these reformers sought to address the underlying issues that the
child faced: youthful antisocial behavior and family dysfunction.
These issues were heightened—if not directly addressed—by pov-
erty, immigration status, and racism. The adult criminal court was
considered unable to distinguish the special developmental needs
of children in order to treat them differently than adults.13 The
juvenile court, by contrast, would organize around these develop-
mental and treatment needs, creating a rehabilitative ideal that was
not rooted in the particular acts of the child or parent but focused
instead on the potential outcome of appropriate practices on be-
half of the youth.14
Judges of this early court saw themselves as the equivalent of
doctors: not confined to the offense the youth committed, but
more interested in the underlying causes in order to administer
the right disposition.15 As Judge Harvey Humphrey Baker, the first
judge of the Boston juvenile court, noted:
In determining the disposition to be made of the case . . . . [t]he
judge and probation officer consider together, like a physician
and his junior, whether the outbreak which resulted in the ar-
rest of the child was largely accidental, or whether it is habitual
or likely to be so; whether it is due chiefly to some inherent
physical or moral defect of the child, or whether some feature of
his environment is an important factor; and then they address
themselves to the question of how permanently to prevent the
recurrence.16
The medical metaphor still resonates. One of the most distin-
guished family court judges in recent years, Judge Leonard Ed-
wards of California, described the family court similarly: “We are
the legal equivalent to an emergency room in the medical profes-
sion. We intervene in crises and figure out the best response on a
12 Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 259 (2008).
13 Id.
14 Id.; see also DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING (2004).
15 Jane M. Spinak, Judicial Leadership in Family Court: A Cautionary Tale, 10 TENN.
J.L. & POL’Y 47, 51-52 (2014) [hereinafter Spinak, A Cautionary Tale].
16 Harvey Humphrey Baker, Judge Baker on the Procedure of the Boston Juvenile Court,
in HARVEY HUMPHREY BAKER: UPBUILDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT 107, 114 (Judge
Baker Found., 1921).
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case-by-case, individualized basis.”17 While not employing the medi-
cal metaphor directly, the rationale for the modern problem-solv-
ing court movement is strikingly similar. One of the foremost
proponents of problem-solving courts, Greg Berman, describes
“the authority of courts to address the underlying problems of indi-
vidual litigants, the structural problems of the justice system, and
the social problems of the communities.”18 Berman is speaking of
the broad range of problem-solving courts that his organization,
The Center for Court Innovation, has helped to launch across the
country in the last two decades, but he could easily be speaking
about the family courts that emerged out of the original juvenile
court throughout the twentieth century.19 New York’s unified fam-
ily court, for example, was created in 1962 as a problem-solving
court to replace, in part, the Children’s Court, which was created
as a problem-solving court at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.20 The new unified family court—which would have original
jurisdiction over child protective and delinquency matters as well
as concurrent jurisdiction over issues of custody, support, and fam-
ily offenses—was granted broad discretion to maintain the prob-
lem-solving approach:
[The Family Court Act] defines the conditions on which the
family court may intervene in the life of a child, parent and
spouse. Once these conditions are satisfied, the court is given a
wide range of powers for dealing with the complexities of family
life so that its action may fit the particular needs of those before
it. The judges of the court are thus given a wide discretion and
grave responsibilities.21
New York’s broad interventionist approach exists throughout most
of the country and is reinforced by national organizations, like the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, which has
17 Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of Santa Clara, Remarks
on Receiving the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence at the U.S. Su-
preme Court (Nov. 18, 2004), in JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Winter 2005, at 45, 45.
18 See Greg Berman, “What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?” Problem Solving in the State
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000); see also Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families:
The Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 331, 362 (2002) [hereinafter
Spinak, Adding Value].
19 Berman, supra note 18, at 78; see generally ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVA-
TION, BREAKING WITH TRADITION: INTRODUCING PROBLEM SOLVING IN CONVENTIONAL
COURTS (2007), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/break%20with
%20trad.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y27V-RHBE] (discussing the emergence and pur-
pose of problem-solving courts).
20 See ALFRED J. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CHILDREN’S COURT 31 (1953) (describing the creation and re-creation of Children’s
Court jurisdiction from 1902 until 1933).
21 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 141 (McKinney 1962).
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championed the court as a place where a team of professionals led
by the judge can provide a range of assistance and services for the
families who find themselves in the court.22 Most recent family
court reform efforts reinforce this paradigm, whether the reform-
ers are pursuing a unified family court, which consolidates all the
issues facing a family before one judge so that the judge can ad-
dress the family’s needs holistically, or the reformers are creating
specialized family court parts, like FCTPs, where the judge similarly
helps to create and monitor solutions to the family’s problems.23
Either way, three assumptions exist: that the court is capable of
intervening in a family’s life not just to resolve the legal dispute
that brought the family to court but to improve the family’s life by
addressing the complex social, emotional or psychological issues
underlying the dispute; that court intervention will improve out-
comes for families, and, most centrally, that the court is a good
place to resolve family problems.24
As I have written elsewhere, I am deeply suspicious of an in-
terventionist court whose primary purpose is to improve the lives of
the children and families coming into the court.25 This is for multi-
ple reasons but can be summarized in this response to the unified
family court movement:
A court is, at its core, an instrument of social control. What it
does best is resolve disputed factual issues at a point when the
litigants cannot resolve them by themselves. Courts gain control
over these acrimonious situations only through the threat or re-
ality of coercion. Thus, courts are generally seen as an option of
22 See generally NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, THE MODEL
COURT EFFECT: PROVEN STRATEGIES IN SYSTEMS’ CHANGE 2 (2009), http://www.ncj
fcj.org/sites/default/files/Model%20Courts%20Brochure_Effect_2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/LU4C-LWGP].
23 Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Fam-
ily Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 527
(1998); see Spinak, supra note 12, at 261, 262-63, 269-71 (2008) (giving an explanation
of “one family, one judge” and describing the various challenges facing problem-solv-
ing courts and the judges presiding over them).
24 Spinak, A Cautionary Tale, supra note 15, at 78-79.
25 See generally Spinak, supra note 12 (questioning whether the court is actually the
best place to address significant social problems and its impact on criminal activity
and family functioning); see also generally Spinak, A Cautionary Tale, supra note 15
(challenging the “therapeutic justice” approach in judicial leadership, which shifts
the judge’s role into a healer, and advocating for a return to a more neutral ap-
proach); Jane M. Spinak, A Conversation About Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. MD.
L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 113 (2010) [hereinafter Spinak, Take 2] (focusing
on the potential disparate impact of problem-solving courts on minority families, and
the difficulty supporters and critics involved in the problem-solving court movement
have in talking and listening to each other).
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last resort, somewhere for people to go to resolve serious dis-
putes without resort to violence, and a place where society can
assert its control over behavior that it considers too egregious to
go unpunished. Most people who appear before a court do not
wish to be there, and would have chosen another form of dis-
pute resolution had it been possible.26
If courts are not recognized as instruments of coercion and control
but as places to solve problems, there is a domino effect on fami-
lies, particularly vulnerable families. Situating assistance and ser-
vices with the court can diminish the funding and use of
community-based services, where public health and harm-reduc-
tion types of solutions are more likely to exist and where earlier
intervention can prevent a crisis.27 Instead, more families may be
brought into the court because that is where access to services is
located. This has certainly been the experience in some FCTPs,
where access to faster and better treatment is available.28 These
courts also reduce the responsibility the state has for creating the
problems that result in child protection proceedings. Both the
standard Family Court and the current problem-solving variations
on that standard, such as FCTPs, place accountability on the indi-
vidual parent rather than on the predominant causes of neglect
and abuse: poverty and its ensuing hardships.29 Professor Eric
Miller has noted this accountability shift in considering drug courts
generally: “[t]herapy and responsibility disaggregate the problem
of drug crime from social and governmental forces. They take the
emphasis off the increasing racial segregation and class stratifica-
tion of the inner city, and emphasize the personal characteristics of
the addict.”30 These multiple underlying causes of family stress and
the broader societal and structural failures to address them are
marginalized when problem-solving courts shift the burden of reso-
lution onto the individual parent.31 Finally, due process protec-
26 Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthusi-
asm with Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435, 440-41 (2002).
27 See generally Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective,
12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 590 (2005) (discussing cost efficiency of community-based
preventative programs); see also generally Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Differential
Response in Child Protection, 21 J. L. & POL’Y 73 (2012) (discussing effectiveness and
value of community-based organizations in differential response programs).
28 See infra Part III.
29 Garrison, supra note 27, at 595-99, 612-16 (arguing for an empirically-based sys-
tem of assistance to address the multiplicity of factors that produce child maltreat-
ment and subsequent child welfare interventions, including foster care).
30 Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417,
427 (2009).
31 Garrison, supra note 27, at 595-99 (outlining the various ways in which social
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tions are diminished in a problem-solving court where greater
emphasis is placed on collaboration, supervision, and monitoring.
Professor Wendy Bach has called this form of increased control
hyperregulation:
[W]e link support to punishment, and we structure these sys-
tems in a way that is highly coercive and that disproportionately
harms poor families led by African American women. When it
comes to poor families in general and poor families of color in
particular, we have a penchant for control and degradation. At
the end of the day, judges are judges and therefore have at their
disposal a fundamentally coercive toolbox. They order, and they
punish parties for failing to comply with their orders. Exposing
more and more poor families to these coercive settings and
making participation in such settings the price of support invites
more hyperregulation. To make matters worse, not only do
problem-solving courts involve these considerable risks but tying
such courts to abandoning rights leaves families even more
vulnerable.32
If problem-solving courts are not the preferred solution for
vulnerable families, the rights that they are holding onto have to be
meaningful and productive. At base, this requires effective assis-
tance of counsel, a right that remains elusive but, when provided,
changes the very way we consider the options for vulnerable
families.
II. LIMITS OF PARENT REPRESENTATION IN FAMILY COURT
Family court has never cottoned to lawyers, particularly lawyers
for parents. If the court is constructed around a judge who can
determine what is best for children through a problem-solving ap-
proach and put that plan into effect, the need for procedural due
process protections feels less urgent. When New York created the
unified family court in 1962, no provision for the assignment of
counsel for indigent parents in child maltreatment cases was in-
cluded in the new Family Court Act (FCA).33 Ten years later, the
New York Court of Appeals determined that the loss of a child’s
policies and law have failed to understand, prevent, or address child maltreatment).
The more the burden for addressing child welfare is placed on the individual through
the court-based problem-solving paradigm, the less likely that Garrison’s recommen-
dations will be considered.
32 Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1073 (2015) (foot-
note omitted) (reviewing CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UN-
DERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014)); see also Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and
Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113 (2011).
33 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262 (McKinney 2012).
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society in a neglect proceeding “involves too fundamental an inter-
est and right” not to be protected by the procedural due process
right of assigned counsel.34 The FCA was subsequently amended in
1975 to codify the right of indigent parents to be apprised of and
assigned counsel in child maltreatment proceedings.35
Many states were far less committed to providing counsel for
indigent parents and recognizing the fundamental right of family
integrity involved in a court hearing that could result in children
being removed from their parent’s care, either temporarily or per-
manently; many states provided no right to counsel and others only
provided counsel on a case-by-case basis.36 This led Abby Gail
Lassiter to challenge the failure of Durham County, North Caro-
lina, to provide her with counsel prior to terminating her parental
rights.37 Lassiter’s case reached the Supreme Court in 1981, where
a divided Court determined that indigent parents were only enti-
tled to counsel on a case-by-case basis, allowing the family court
judge to resolve whether counsel was necessary to protect the par-
ent’s right to fundamental fairness in the proceeding.38
Lassiter was a single parent whose youngest son, William, had
been declared neglected and placed in foster care a year before
Lassiter was imprisoned for second-degree murder.39 Her four
older children lived with Lassiter’s mother.40 Three years later,
Durham County Department of Social Services filed a termination
of parental rights case to free William for adoption.41 On the first
day that Lassiter was produced from prison, the family court judge
decided that she had received ample time to secure counsel de-
spite being in prison and proceeded with the hearing.42 Lassiter
appeared pro se and, as Justice Blackmun recounts in his dissent,
failed miserably as her own counsel:
An experienced attorney might have translated petitioner’s re-
action and emotion into several substantive legal arguments.
34 In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 356 (1972).
35 Sobie, supra note 33.
36 See Erik J. Foley, No Money, No Lawyer—No Children: The Right to Counsel for Indi-
gent Defendants in Nevada Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 16 NEV. L.J. 313,
321-22 (2015).
37 See generally In re Lassiter, 259 S.E.2d 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting the
claim by incarcerated mother that she had a due process right to representation by
appointed counsel).
38 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
39 Id. at 20.
40 Id. at 23.
41 Id. at 21.
42 Id.
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The State charged petitioner with failing to arrange a “construc-
tive plan” for her child’s future or to demonstrate a “positive
response” to the Department’s intervention. A defense would
have been that petitioner had arranged for the child to be cared
for properly by his grandmother, and evidence might have been
adduced to demonstrate the adequacy of the grandmother’s
care of the other children. . . . The Department’s own “dili-
gence” in promoting the family’s integrity was never put in issue
during the hearing, yet it is surely significant in light of peti-
tioner’s incarceration and lack of access to her child. . . . Finally,
the asserted willfulness of petitioner’s lack of concern could ob-
viously have been attacked since she was physically unable to
regain custody or perhaps even to receive meaningful visits dur-
ing 21 of the 24 months preceding the action.43
Lassiter attempted to cross-examine the only witness for the state, a
social worker who had visited her in prison once and who referred
repeatedly to the agency record that was not entered in evidence.44
Lassiter testified herself under questioning by the judge.45 The
judge and the county attorney questioned Lassiter’s mother but
Lassiter was never told she could also question her mother.46 The
county attorney made a closing argument and when the judge
asked if Lassiter had anything to say, she responded: “Yes. I don’t
think it’s right.”47 The judge determined that Lassiter had
“‘wilfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for the wel-
fare of the minor,’ and because it was ‘in the best interests of the
minor,’ the court terminated Ms. Lassiter’s status as William’s
parent.”48
Justice Blackmun in his dissent notes the remarkable similarity
between Justice Stewart’s Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test analysis
for the Court and his own. Both find “the private interest [of the
parent] weighty, the [case-by-case] procedure devised by the State
fraught with risks of error, and the countervailing governmental
interest insubstantial.”49 Yet instead of reaching the same conclu-
sion—that the Mathews test clearly supports providing counsel to
indigent parents in every case—the Court found counsel was not
43 Id. at 56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
44 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 53-55.
45 Id. at 54-55.
46 Id. at 55.
47 Id. at 56.
48 Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
49 See id. at 48-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the Mathews test, wherein
the Court balances three distinct factors: the private interest affected; the risk of error
under the procedure employed by the State; and the countervailing governmental
interest in support of the challenged procedure).
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an inherent due process right in termination of parental rights
cases.50 In dissent, Justice Blackmun found “virtually incredible the
Court’s conclusion today that her termination proceeding was fun-
damentally fair. . . . [T]he Court simply ignores the defendant’s
obvious inability to speak effectively for herself, a factor the Court
has found to be highly significant in past cases.”51 The majority was
nevertheless troubled by its own determination that the case-by-
case approach satisfies Constitutional due process requirements. In
an awkwardly worded final sentence that embraces categorical rep-
resentation instead, the opinion concludes: “The Court’s opinion
today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by
informed public opinion and now widely followed by the States are
other than enlightened and wise.”52
Despite the enlightenment exhibited by many states, there was
concern that the Court’s imprimatur on case-by-case determina-
tions would either encourage states to roll back their categorical
approach to providing counsel or discourage states from aban-
doning the case-by-case approach. Legislatures or high courts
mostly moved in the opposite direction. By 2015, forty-five states
and the District of Columbia provided indigent parents with a cate-
gorical right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceed-
ings.53 Many states have also expanded the application of the right
to counsel to other proceedings and stages of proceedings in the
family court.54 In one recent significant set-back, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court held that the legislature’s decision to abolish
the statutory right to counsel in every case as a cost-cutting mecha-
nism did not violate the state or federal constitutions.55
Acknowledging the role of counsel in protecting the funda-
mental right of family integrity has not yet resulted in effective rep-
resentation nationally.56 Serious limitations exist on the actual
50 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32 (majority opinion) (“[W]e [cannot] say that the Con-
stitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceed-
ing. We therefore adopt the standard found appropriate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and
leave the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indi-
gent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the
trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.”).
51 Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 34 (majority opinion).
53 Foley, supra note 36, at 322.
54 Id. at 322-23.
55 Martin Guggenheim & Susan Jacobs, A New National Movement in Parent Represen-
tation, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 44 (2013) (discussing the decision in In re C.M., 48
A.3d 942 (N.H. 2012)).
56 The substantive due process right of family integrity was most recently reaf-
firmed in Troxel v. Granville, where the Supreme Court concluded: “In light of this
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provision and assistance of counsel for parents in child maltreat-
ment and termination of parental rights proceedings across the
country. Attorneys may not be appointed for all stages of the pro-
ceedings; they may be appointed after critical preliminary
processes have begun; they may not be properly compensated.57
An American Bar Association survey of parents’ lawyers found that
these attorneys may be paid as little as $200 for an entire case.58
These limitations have significant impact on attorneys embracing
this difficult work. Michigan, for example, found that custodial par-
ents were only represented at removal hearings 60% of the time
and 50% of the time at non-removal preliminary hearings. In some
counties, counsel is never appointed for preliminary hearings and
parents may wait weeks for counsel after their children have al-
ready been removed.59 Michigan has no standard state compensa-
tion rate so attorney compensation varies among counties, with few
counties paying lawyers an hourly rate. Some counties pay by the
hearing or stage of the case, even distinguishing payment by
whether the client enters a plea or a hearing is conducted, regard-
less of the amount of work the lawyer must do to prepare.60 The
compensation is so low that these lawyers maintain caseloads in the
hundreds, which severely limits their advocacy for any particular
client. Lawyers rarely speak to their clients before court and, be-
cause of scheduling conflicts, substitute counsel is frequently re-
quired. And while Michigan is one of the few states that provides
for a jury trial in child protection fact finding hearings, in 2005
jury verdicts occurred in 1% of the cases while parents pled to the
allegations against them in close to 4000 cases.61
Michigan’s experience was revealed because the state chose to
study the issue.62 In New York, the experience of assigned counsel
extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
57 Leonard Edwards, Representation of Parents and Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases:
The Importance of Early Appointment, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 2012, at 21, 23-25; Vivek
S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent’s Right to Counsel in Child Welfare Cases, 28 A.B.A. CHILD
L. PRAC. 97, 102-04 (2009).
58 Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 55.
59 Vivek Sankaran & Itzhak Lander, Procedural Injustice: How the Practices and Proce-
dures of the Child Welfare System Disempower Parents and Why It Matters, MICH. CHILD WEL-
FARE L.J., Fall 2007, at 11, 13-14.
60 Id. at 14.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 14 n.27 (citing MUSKIE SCH. OF PUB. SERV. & AM. BAR ASS’N, MICHIGAN
COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM REASSESSMENT 134 (2005), http://courts.mi.gov/Ad-
ministration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Reports/CIPABA-Reas-
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was the basis of a lawsuit in 2000—the NYCLA decision—to deter-
mine “whether New York State’s failure to increase the compensa-
tion rates for assigned counsel violates the constitutional and
statutory right to meaningful and effective representation.”63 At
the time, counsel was paid $40 per hour for in-court work and $25
per hour for out-of-court work.64 The court after a bench trial de-
termined that the legislature’s failure “to increase the assigned
counsel rates [results], in many cases, in denial of counsel, delay in
the appointment of counsel, and less than meaningful and effec-
tive legal representation.”65 In considering the impact on parent
representation in family court in New York City, Judge Lucindo
Suarez found there were insufficient numbers of assigned counsel
in all five boroughs to be available to represent parents.66 In New
York County, for example, assigned counsel did not staff 40% of
intake shifts.67 Large numbers of family court matters, including
child protective and foster care placement and review proceedings,
never had counsel assigned.68 Half of the assigned counsel submit-
ted vouchers indicating that they had worked fewer than five out-
of-court hours on their cases.69 At the time of the trial, the assigned
counsel administrator testified that she had 65 attorneys available
in Bronx and New York Counties and needed 325 to staff the in-
take parts.70 Because of the size of their caseloads and their inabil-
ity to do their jobs, most assigned counsel had stopped accepting
new cases.71 The family court routinely proceeded with cases with
no counsel present, causing Judge Suarez to determine irreparable
harm to the litigants and unconscionable delay in court proceed-
ings, resulting in children being removed from their homes and
languishing in foster care, often without proper visitation orders,
and more likely to be subject to termination of parental rights.72
sess.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8XE-8QN2]); see also JASON A. OETJEN, NAT’L COUNCIL
OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, IMPROVING PARENTS’ REPRESENTATION IN DEPEN-
DENCY CASES: A WASHINGTON STATE PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION (2003), http://
www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0047-2003_PRP_Evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZSZ4-MY6Y] (finding improved outcomes for families with enhanced parent
representation).
63 N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 196 Misc.2d 761, 762 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
64 Id. at 764.
65 Id. at 763.
66 Id. at 764.
67 Id. at 766.
68 Id.
69 N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 196 Misc.2d at 766.
70 Id. at 767.
71 Id. at 776.
72 Id. at 772-73.
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 95 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 95 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY106.txt unknown Seq: 14  1-FEB-17 12:04
184 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:171
The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to
raise the assigned counsel rate and to equalize the rate between in-
court and out-of-court work was an unconstitutional violation of
“the constitutional and statutory right to legal representation of
children and indigent adults in New York City Family and Criminal
Courts, and result in a constitutional imbalance among the
branches of government impairing the judiciary’s ability to func-
tion.”73 The court issued a mandatory injunction requiring as-
signed counsel to be paid $90 per hour for all work until the
legislature acted.74
While the impact of the NYCLA decision was eventually real-
ized—encouraging more lawyers to join the assigned counsel panel
and for many to provide effective assistance of counsel through
meaningful out-of-court and in-court work—improving the rates
and structure of the assigned counsel plan remained a limited solu-
tion for the thousands of litigants entitled to counsel yearly in fam-
ily court.75 As Judge Suarez found, effective assistance of counsel
includes certain basic tasks in all cases, such as interviewing and
counseling clients, conducting independent investigations and de-
veloping evidence, actively participating in every stage of the pro-
ceedings, and timely assignment to be able to work with clients
from the very beginning of a case.76 To do this well required a solu-
tion beyond fixing the assigned counsel plan, a turn instead toward
a system of institutional representation that already existed for
adult criminal defendants and children in family court delin-
quency and child maltreatment cases in New York City. But that
turn did not come immediately. Instead, the court system focused
first on creating “model court” parts that would improve the qual-
ity of child maltreatment proceedings, particularly where allega-
tions of substance abuse was present.77 The FCTPs that resulted
considered counsel to be less central to securing fundamental fair-
ness than having a problem-solving team approach.
73 Id. at 778.
74 Id.
75 See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, NYSBA TASK FORCE ON FAMILY COURT FINAL
REPORT 43 (2013), https://nysba.org/TFFCFinalReport/ [https://perma.cc/FZ5C-
GF2L] (“Testimony presented to the Task Force described determinations of inability
to afford counsel that were inconsistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in some
instances involved a broad use of discretion that did not appear to fulfill statutory
intent.”); see also Sheri Bonstelle & Christine Schessler, Comment, Adjourning Justice:
New York State’s Failure to Support Assigned Counsel Violates the Rights of Families In Child
Abuse And Neglect Proceedings, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1151 (2001).
76 See N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 196 Misc.2d at 778-82.
77 See Spinak, Adding Value, supra note 18, at 350-55.
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III. CREATION OF FAMILY COURT TREATMENT PARTS
New York State created its first FCTP in 1997 and was desig-
nated a “model court” site under the auspices of the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges Model Courts Project
in 1998.78 The same year, the first FCTP was launched in New York
City.79 Parents accused of neglecting their children because of sub-
stance abuse could participate in an extensive alternative court
conferencing and monitoring system.80 Eligible parents were as-
sessed by the FCTP clinical staff, were required to waive their right
to a litigated hearing, and had to admit that neglect was caused by
their addiction.81 The parent then entered into a negotiated treat-
ment plan that had been created by the FCTP clinical staff, the
parent and her counsel, the lawyer for the children, and the child
protective agency’s attorney and caseworker; the plan was also ap-
proved by the presiding judge.82 The parent was then referred im-
mediately to treatment providers who contracted with the court to
have available treatment spaces.83 What ensued was an intensive
78 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, NEW YORK (2011), http://
www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/NEW%20YORK%20STATE%20OUTREACH.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GLF-CQTD]. “The National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges’ Permanency Planning for Children Department (NCJFCJ/PPCD) has
created a web site that highlights the Child Victims Act Model Courts Project, which
[was] funded by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice & Delin-
quency Prevention (OJJDP). . . . The model courts initiative is described by its funder,
OJJDP, as ‘a nationwide effort to improve how courts handle child abuse and neglect
cases, [that] is helping children spend less time in foster care and resulting in earlier
resolution of cases in dependency courts.’ The model courts are part of the larger
effort by the NCJFCJ/PPCD ‘to educate judges and other practitioners on the need to
expedite secure safe permanent placements for all maltreated children, either by
making it possible for them to safely stay with or return to their own families or by
finding them safe adoptive homes.’ The model court description also includes other
key elements seen as essential for success: interdisciplinary training and technical as-
sistance for all youth-serving professionals using the NCJFCJ’s Resource Guidelines as
a blueprint for improving court practice; identifying ‘lead’ judges to mobilize all the
relevant players within their jurisdictions; developing programs that can be seen as
easily replicable in other jurisdictions; piloting innovative alternative dispute resolu-
tion methods; and sharing information locally and nationwide through enhanced
data systems.” Spinak, Adding Value, supra note 18, at 361-62 (footnotes omitted). The
current version of the Project’s work is found at the NCJFCJ website. See Model Courts,
NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/view/81/
145/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2016).
79 See Spinak, Adding Value, supra note 18, at 355.
80 Robert Victor Wolf, Fixing Families: The Story of the Manhattan Family Treatment
Court, 2 J. CTR. FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 5, 5, 15-16 (2000).
81 Id. at 11-12.
82 Id.
83 See Gloria Sosa-Lintner, Family Treatment Court, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT AND
THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: EFFECTIVE SOCIAL WORK AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM; THE ATTOR-
NEY’S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 609, 616 (David J. Lansner ed., 10th ed. 2000).
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period of court supervision, with frequent in-court drug testing
and appearances before the judge by the parent and other FCTP
“team” members, including the lawyers and agency caseworkers.84
Rewards for complying with the treatment plan could include
longer periods of visitation and less supervision of the parent with
her children.85 Sanctions for positive drug tests or other lapses in
plan compliance ranged from more frequent drug testing and
court attendance to ultimate dismissal from the FCTP, sending the
parent back to a regular child protective court part. Absconding
from a residential program could be sanctioned by a warrant and
jail time.86
During the first two years of the FCTP, thirty parents and
guardians were reunited with seventy-two children whose average
length of stay in foster care was eleven months. Approximately
sixty-eight percent of the parent participants were in compliance
with court mandates at the start of the FCTP’s third year.87 In New
York City, where children then spent an average of four years in
foster care, these numbers were impressive.88 These were families,
however, for whom the most serious allegations of neglect or abuse
had been screened out, and thus were more likely to have faster
reunification.89 Thirty families also have to be seen in perspective.
In 1999, during the second year of the FCTP, over 12,000 original
child protective and voluntary placement proceedings were filed in
New York City.90 And as the NYCLA litigation established, parents
in the late 1990s were unlikely to receive effective assistance of
counsel in those proceedings. The enhanced staffing and re-
sources of the FCTP for a small number of carefully chosen fami-
lies should have had the anticipated results.
By 2009, the practices of this FCTP had become standard-
ized—as revealed by conversations with parent advocates at the
time. The FCTP staff would identify potential FCTP parent partici-
84 John Courtney et al., Gentler Justice: Family Treatment Court, CHILD WELFARE
WATCH, Winter 1999, at 12, 12-13 (“As the details are worked out—and shaped into a
contract that the parent must sign—the court makes referrals to one of about 35
recovery agencies and assigns other services. Parents must come back to the court
every two weeks for at least a year to update the court on their activities and submit to
drug testing.”).
85 Wolf, supra note 80, at 15-16.
86 Sosa-Lintner, supra note 83, at 628-29.
87 See Wolf, supra note 80, at 19.
88 David Fischer et al., A Statistical Snapshot: The Scoppetta Years, CHILD WELFARE
WATCH, Winter 2001, at 12, 12; David Fischer et al., Watching the Numbers, CHILD WEL-
FARE WATCH, Winter 2001, at 15, 15.
89 See Wolf, supra note 80, at 10-11.
90 Spinak, Adding Value, supra note 18, at 331.
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pants from the cases being filed by the Administration for Chil-
dren’s Services (ACS). After a petition was filed, the FCTP
coordinator would discuss with the parent the possibility of enter-
ing the FCTP prior to the parent speaking to her attorney. The co-
ordinator would explain how the FCTP worked but did not discuss
any of the parent’s legal rights. If the parent thought she might
want to participate, she would agree to an assessment and sign an
assessment waiver, which indicated that information in the assess-
ment would not be used against her in the future. Only then would
she have the opportunity to speak to her lawyer and learn that
among the conditions of participation, she would have to make an
admission of neglect and waive her statutory right to a preliminary
hearing on the removal of her child from her care. Family visiting
procedures with her children were often inflexible, the FCTP staff
approved only certain treatment and service programs, and alter-
native programs and assistance identified by the parent or her
counsel were not considered. The case would be monitored in
court every thirty days or so. At the point where a decision would
be made about whether the goals of the treatment plan had been
met and the case should be ended, a meeting would be held with
the FCTP staff, the ACS attorney, and the judge. Parent’s counsel
was not invited to participate in this meeting.91
While FCTPs around the state developed a range of diverse
practices—and the New York County FCTP is only one example—
there were no established state standards or guidelines for the crea-
tion and implementation of FCTPs for more than a decade after
the first FCTPs were instituted. Finally, sometime in 2010, the New
York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) issued a compen-
dium of “Effective Practices” for FCTPs, which included guiding
principles and practices for the courts as well as some of the lim-
ited information gathered about the FCTPs experiences across
New York State since their implementation.92 An advisory commit-
tee to OCA had worked on these recommendations for about two
years starting in 2007 but they were not published until long after
the committee completed its work; the report remains difficult to
91 Spinak, Take 2, supra note 25, at 128 (describing conversations with parent advo-
cates at the time). The requirement of admitting neglect and the inability to conduct
a post removal hearing remained in effect even though some of the other practices
began to change about the time that article was published. That will be discussed
more in the text accompanying notes 102-06, infra.
92 See generally JUDY HARRIS KLUGER ET AL., ADVISORY COMM., NEW YORK STATE FAM-
ILY TREATMENT COURTS: EFFECTIVE PRACTICES (2010), https://www.nycourts.gov/
courts/problem_solving/drugcourts/pdfs/EffectivePracticesFINALSept.2010.PDF
[https://perma.cc/5FC5-WDWV] [hereinafter EFFECTIVE PRACTICES].
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access.93 This is especially unfortunate because the ultimate report,
which was guided to completion by the founder of the first FCTP
in New York State, Judge Nicolette Pach, was indeed a blueprint for
creating and sustaining these courts in ways that recognized both
their advantages and their challenges.94 Several aspects are worth
exploring in analyzing the overall approach of FCTPs in the con-
text of the discussion of parents’ counsel.
The report was thorough and responsive to the concerns of
the participants involved in creating and implementing a FCTP.
The guiding principles of the report strove to balance the substan-
tive and procedural due process rights of adults and children
brought to court in a child maltreatment case with the underlying
structure of a court focused on the effective provision of treatment
to maintain or reunify families through a non-adversarial ap-
proach. This was done in several ways. First, every professional par-
ticipant—judge, attorneys, child protective workers, and
specialized court personnel—were recognized as first being dedi-
cated to their own professional obligations and only second to the
team in which they were being asked to join.95 This is particularly
important for parents’ lawyers who have a duty of loyalty to their
client who is being subjected to this court process. In recognizing
the importance of this loyalty to encourage client trust and com-
munication, the report urges the other participants to understand
how the parent’s lawyer’s “inviolable confidential relationship” to
the client may at times conflict with the purpose of the court and
the expectations of the other members of the court team.96 This
certainly played out in practice when lawyers representing clients
participating in a FCTP would refuse to reveal confidential infor-
mation that the client did not want revealed.97 The report recom-
93 I served on the Advisory Committee and closely followed the issuance of the
document. I made a public call for the issuance of the Effective Practices materials in
a forum on problem-solving courts and again in a published article as well as through
correspondence with appropriate officials. See also Drug Treatment Courts,
NYCOURTS.GOV, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/drugcourts/re-
ports.shtml [https://perma.cc/483B-6T9H] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
94 The New York County FCTP, described earlier, was the second. SARAH PICARD-
FRITSCHE ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE BRONX FAMILY TREATMENT COURT
2005-2010: IMPACT ON FAMILY COURT OUTCOMES AND PARTICIPANT EXPERIENCES AND
PERCEPTIONS 10 (2011), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/Full_Bronx_FTC.pdf [https://perma.cc/X986-ZFGT].
95 EFFECTIVE PRACTICES, supra note 92, at 19.
96 Id. at 105.
97 Interview with Kara Finck, Practice Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law
Sch. (Mar. 24, 2016) (notes on file with author). Professor Finck was the Managing
Attorney for the Family Defense Practice at the Bronx Defenders from 2004-12.
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 98 Side A      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 98 Side A      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY106.txt unknown Seq: 19  1-FEB-17 12:04
2016] DISAPPEARING PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT 189
mended that one way to achieve an understanding of divided
loyalties is to engage parents’ counsel (and all other relevant coun-
sel, including the children’s lawyers) in every aspect of the court’s
work, from the initial establishment to participation in all team
and court meetings to reviewing and reorganizing court processes
as needed.98 In this way, parents’ counsel is cognizant of every as-
pect of the court’s workings and is able then to counsel her client
fully on whether to choose to enter the FCTP, engage the client in
a meaningful discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of
submitting to FCTP jurisdiction, and discuss the likelihood of re-
vealing otherwise confidential information. Several of the report’s
other principles offer parents’ counsel additional reasons for rec-
ommending client participation: reminding FCTP team members
and the judge that incentives and sanctions are intended to be con-
sequences of parental actions and not punishments or rewards;
that parent-child visiting should be driven solely by child safety and
best interests and not as a sanction for program non-compliance;99
that violations of court orders should rarely, if ever, result in incar-
ceration and only after full compliance with due process mandates;
that relapse is a component of recovery and needs to be consid-
ered in the context of everything else being achieved by the parent;
and finally, that negotiated agreements for submitting to the
court’s jurisdiction should recognize a parent’s right to contest re-
moval of her children and the allegations of maltreatment and re-
main flexible beyond simply requiring a full admission to
participate in a FCTP.100 Even the report’s extensive recommenda-
tions on data entry encourage analyzing the effectiveness of the
FCTPs on achieving the court’s primary goals of maintaining or
reuniting children “with the recovering parent as long as the par-
ent can sustain a safe, stable, and nurturing permanent home for
her family.”101
Perhaps if these Effective Practices had been created and utilized
closer to the advent of FCTPs, attorneys for parents would have
become full partners in developing the FCTP while also protecting
their clients’ rights.102 When the New York County FCTP was first
98 EFFECTIVE PRACTICES, supra note 92, at 86.
99 But see PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at 19 (“[C]ourt observations re-
vealed that a common FTC sanction is to reduce visitation privileges that a respon-
dent has with his or her children.”).
100 EFFECTIVE PRACTICES, supra note 92, at 18-19, 71-74, 113-14, 152. But see PICARD-
FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at 19.
101 EFFECTIVE PRACTICES, supra note 92, at 8, 11, 136; see also id. at 10, 44-45.
102 Remarkably, even today, across the country most states have yet to create rules,
guidelines, and practices for FCTPs. Only 16 states have some form of statewide stan-
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created, neither potential treatment agencies nor the attorneys
who would be appearing on behalf of parents and children were
initially included in the planning. Only after the institutional pro-
vider of children’s counsel in neglect and abuse proceedings con-
vened a meeting of treatment providers and family court lawyers to
discuss the FCTP, did the court system agree to include other
stakeholders in any aspects of the planning.103 At the time, parents
were represented by assigned counsel and, as the NYCLA case es-
tablished, were unable to participate meaningfully in either plan-
ning or attendance in the FCTP. Nevertheless, significant resources
were put into the FCTP and, as described earlier, initially resulted
in better treatment and reunification outcomes for the small num-
ber of parents who participated.104 By 2009, resources and staff had
been cut and the parent’s due process rights were diminished: par-
ents did not speak to counsel before being assessed by the FCTP
coordinator, admissions to neglect were always required, and par-
ent attorneys were not routinely included in team meetings.105 The
Center for Family Representation had been created to represent
parents in New York County and was challenging some of these
FCTP practices and counseling clients about their concerns.106 A
parallel experience was occurring in the Bronx, where the Bronx
Defenders had also started a family court practice in 2004.107 The
creation of this family defense representation tracks the diminish-
ment of FCTP in New York City. Before examining the impact of
these offices on FCTPs, it is worth understanding what is known
about the effectiveness of FCTPs and how that informs counseling
a client to participate in a FCTP.
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FAMILY COURT TREATMENT PARTS
FCTPs have proliferated since the late 1990s, reaching over
dards. See Problem-solving Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Ser-
vices-and-Experts/Areas-of-expertise/Problem-solving-courts.aspx [https://perma.cc/
7D9D-6MLP] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) (follow “View table” hyperlink under AN
OVERVIEW OF STATEWIDE EFFORTS BY PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT TYPE).
103 The meeting was convened by the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Soci-
ety. At the time I was the Attorney-in-Charge of the division.
104 See Wolf, supra note 80.
105 See Spinak, Take 2, supra note 25; see also Interview with Michele Cortese, Exec.
Dir., Ctr. for Family Representation (Apr. 1, 2016) (notes on file with author).
106 A change of judges also impacted CFR’s ability to challenge some practices. For
example, some presiding judges were more open to considering ACDs or to holding
removal hearings in the FCTP as well as communicating about court procedures more
regularly with parents’ counsel. Email from Michele Cortese, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Fam-
ily Representation (Dec. 2, 2016, 11:45 EST) (on file with author).
107 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97.
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300 across the country in the last two decades.108 In an era when
government is clamoring for “evidence-based” services, the effec-
tiveness of FCTPs remains unproven for multiple, intersecting rea-
sons. The first, and most important, is that none of the FCTP
studies so far have been randomized. The best quasi-experimental
studies conducted to date have mostly (but not entirely) provided
promising outcomes, but the variability of their designs and size,
and their inability to account for which variables in the FCTP lead
to the more positive outcomes for families, are significant limita-
tions acknowledged by all of the researchers.109 The studies have
generally measured two aspects of FCTPs: substance abuse treat-
ment for parents and child welfare outcomes. Since the central
purpose of submitting to FCTP jurisdiction is to address substance
use affecting parenting, the likelihood of entering treatment, the
time to treatment, days spent in treatment, and the likelihood of
completing at least one treatment were identified as indicative of
FCTP effectiveness.110 Successful treatment is intended to lead to
better child welfare outcomes; these include the decreased likeli-
hood of a child’s out-of-home placement, less time spent in out-of-
home placement, less time needed to reach permanency (an out-
come that prioritizes family reunification, a stable placement
outside of foster care, or adoption), and family reunification.111
With one significant exception discussed more fully below, on all
of these measures (except time to permanency and with variation
within the studies), participating in the FCTP had a positive im-
pact. What none of the researchers have been able to answer is
108 WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING
THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2011), http://www.ndci.org/
sites/default/files/nadcp/PCP%20Report%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/G84L-
SVVE].
109 See, e.g., Eric J. Bruns et al., Effects of a Multidisciplinary Family Treatment Drug
Court on Child and Family Outcomes: Results of a Quasi-Experimental Study, 17 CHILD MAL-
TREATMENT 218, 226-29 (2012); Sonia D. Worcel et al., Effects of Family Treatment Drug
Courts on Substance Abuse and Child Welfare Outcomes, 17 CHILD ABUSE REV. 427, 434-39
(2008); Beth Green et al., How Effective Are Family Treatment Drug Courts? Outcomes From
a Four-Site National Study, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 43, 56-58 (2007). Other quasi-ex-
perimental studies have measured different or overlapping outcomes and are harder
to use for comparison. See, e.g., PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94; Suzanna Fay-
Ramirez, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Practice: Changes in Family Treatment Court Norms
Over Time, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 205 (2015).
110 See Bruns et al., supra note 109, at 226; see also Green et al., supra note 109, at 55-
56; Worcel et al., supra note 109, at 429.
111 See Bruns et al., supra note 109, at 226-27; see also Green et al., supra note 109, at
56; Worcel et al., supra note 109, at 439-40.
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why.112
The why matters. As the authors of the largest quasi-experi-
mental outcome study acknowledged:
[A]nalysis should address whether the positive reunification out-
come is due simply to the [FCTP] model’s influence on treat-
ment, or whether the [FCTP] model, in and of itself, uniquely
contributes to family reunification. This type of analysis, com-
bined with a more thorough investigation of the features of
[FCTPs] that may lead to parental success, can begin to unpack
the ‘black box’ of [FCTPs] by building an understanding of the
most important operational characteristics of successful [FCTP]
programmes.113
The FCTP’s influence on treatment could occur in several
ways. The FCTP may have faster and better access to treatment
providers; the FCTP may contract with specific treatment providers
otherwise unavailable to parents; the FCTP may monitor the treat-
ment provider services to ensure that it is the appropriate treat-
ment; and the FCTP may have additional resources to accomplish
some or all of these functions. These advantages in securing treat-
ment that parents in other court parts may not currently have avail-
able would not be sufficient justification for creating and staffing a
special court part if rationalizing these approaches and resources
across all child protective cases involving substance abuse treat-
ment could accomplish the same treatment goals. Instead, do
FCTPs offer something beyond increased likelihood of successful
treatment that may also be relating to increased likelihood of
reunification?114 That is, do FCTPs add value to the substantive due
process right of family integrity and, if so, what is it?
This is a difficult question to measure given the variables in
the design and implementation of FCTPs. FCTPs have different cri-
teria for parent participation, screening out parents for a range of
reasons including physical and sexual abuse allegations, mental ill-
ness, previous involvement in child protection or termination of
parental rights proceedings, domestic violence, and willingness or
ability to enter residential treatment.115 FCTPs generally have addi-
tional resources available even beyond treatment opportunities
112 See Bruns et al., supra note 109, at 228; see also Green et al., supra note 109, at 57;
Worcel et al., supra note 109, at 440-41.
113 Worcel et al., supra at 109, at 441.
114 Green et al., supra note 109, at 44 (“Thus, two critical unanswered questions for
[FCTPs] are whether they are successful in helping parents succeed in treatment and,
if so, whether this makes a difference in terms of their child welfare outcomes.”).
115 PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at 7-8.
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that may enhance the court’s work, including additional staff, ac-
cess to specialized child welfare resources, and funding for achieve-
ment incentives.116 FCTPs vary in their sanctions and incentives;
the amount and intensity of attendance at team meetings and
court hearings; the level and scope of the judge’s involvement; and
the role of parents and children’s counsel and other stakehold-
ers.117 They also vary in the stage of the child protective proceed-
ing at which parents can enter the FCTP; whether parents must
admit to neglect to be eligible; criteria for removal or visitation
with children; and graduation requirements and legal dispositions
available to parents, including ultimate dismissal of a case.118 Fi-
nally, during the period that FCTPs began, there were tremendous
reform efforts going on simultaneously which could influence
outcomes.119
These variables matter if FCTPs are to have legitimacy as a rea-
sonable alternative to regular court practice. They matter for advo-
cates counseling clients whether to submit to FCTP jurisdiction. If
a parent cannot be shown the advantage of a court that requires
them to waive many of their due process rights, to be closely moni-
tored by court staff and the judge, to expect that their attorney may
urge them to relate confidential information to the court team, to
be subject to sanctions—including incarceration—that are other-
wise rarely administered in family court for non-compliance with
treatment requirements, and to be uncertain whether this process
will have a greater likelihood of success, the lawyer’s ethical obliga-
tion is to make clear that uncertainty.120 Until recently, there were
116 Green et al., supra note 109, at 44.
117 Id.
118 ADELE HARRELL & ALICE GOODMAN, THE URBAN INST., REVIEW OF SPECIALIZED




119 See id. at 13; see also Green et al., supra note 109, at 56-57.
120 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (2013). As the commentary to Rule 1.4
(Communication) explains: “The client should have sufficient information to partici-
pate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the
means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to
do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assis-
tance that is involved. . . . In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy
and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are
likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. . . . The guiding
principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for informa-
tion consistent with the duty to act in the client’s best interest and the client’s overall
requirements as to the character of representation.” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.4 cmt. 5 (2013).
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few lawyers who were able to offer clients the kind of representa-
tion that could both analyze that uncertainty and offer instead an
effective rights-based solution.
V. CREATION OF FAMILY DEFENSE PRACTICE IN NYC
The Center for Family Representation (CFR) was founded in
2002 to create the first multi-disciplinary institutional legal services
provider intended to become a viable alternative to an assigned
counsel system for parents in child welfare proceedings. Several le-
gal services offices and law school clinical programs had repre-
sented parents in these proceedings over the years but none were
created for the specific purpose of being routinely assigned by the
court to represent parents.121 CFR’s first multi-disciplinary team of
a lawyer, social worker and parent advocate began practicing in
2004, the same year that Bronx Defenders hired its first lawyer to
represent parents in these proceedings.122 Like CFR, Bronx De-
fenders hoped to create a family defense practice that would be the
primary provider of legal services for parents in Bronx family
court.123 In 2007, New York City committed to institutional repre-
sentation for parents by contracting with CFR, Bronx Defenders
and the Brooklyn Family Defense Project to represent most of the
parents in child welfare proceedings in Manhattan, the Bronx and
Brooklyn.124 CFR expanded its representation to Queens in 2011
and Neighborhood Defender Services (NDS) of Harlem was
awarded an additional contract for Harlem neighborhoods in
2014.125 These organizations share a belief that multi-disciplinary
practice provides enhanced representation that results in improved
121 Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 55, at 44; see, e.g., Clinics, N.Y.U. SCH. L.,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics [https://perma.cc/6REC-S2H4] (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2016); Clinics, CARDOZO L., http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/clinics-profes-
sional-skills/clinics [https://perma.cc/A3PF-M5X9] (last visited Dec. 1, 2016); About
MFY, MFY LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.mfy.org/about/about-mfy/ [https://
perma.cc/H9QB-NCW8] (last visited Dec. 1, 2016); Brooklyn Legal Services, LEGAL SER-
VICES NYC, http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/our-program/brooklyn [https://
perma.cc/Y5CQ-BY3B] (last visited Dec. 1, 2016); Bronx Legal Services, LEGAL SERVICES
NYC, http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/our-program/Bronx [https://perma.cc/
3UG7-HKSV] (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
122 CTR. FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION, EVERY FAMILY MATTERS: 10 YEARS OF THE
CENTER FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION 2 (2012), http://www.cfrny.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/12/Annual-Report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AV-F8NX]; Kara
Finck Named Director of Penn Law’s Child Advocacy Clinic, U. PA. L. SCH. (Apr. 10, 2012),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/2045-kara-finck-named-director-of-penn-laws-
child [https://perma.cc/J76M-PGQK] [hereinafter Finck Director].
123 Finck Director, supra note 122.
124 Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 55, at 45.
125 CTR. FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION, supra note 122; Email from Stacy Charland,
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outcomes for families. Lawyers advocate for clients in court pro-
ceedings, ensuring that legal mandates are followed; social workers
help clients identify and secure needed services and assistance;
teams with parent advocates—parents who have personally exper-
ienced the child welfare system and are now trained profession-
als—have an additional resource to engage and support frightened
and traumatized clients. All of these professionals create plans with
their clients that will support children living safely at home.126 In-
stead of the ineffective assistance of counsel experienced by par-
ents across the country whose lawyers are unable or unwilling to
provide this type of holistic representation, this advocacy ensures
that the substantive due process right of family integrity is coupled
with the procedural due process protections of fair proceedings
that are actually convened and litigated. CFR’s outcomes speak di-
rectly to this result. At the time the NYCLA lawsuit was filed in
2000, over 34,000 children were in foster care in New York City,
staying on average over four years.127 Those numbers declined
steadily over the next decade for multiple reasons including overall
federal policies that emphasized more timely permanency and fam-
ily preservation;128 steady progress by ACS to substitute preventive
services for removal of children to foster care;129 a temporary surge
in adoptions;130 large numbers of children exiting foster care in
the first half of the decade;131 and the creation of institutional rep-
resentation for parents.132 In 2007, the year that institutional prov-
Managing Attorney, Family Def. Practice, Neighborhood Def. Serv. of Harlem (Dec.
3, 2016, 16:12 EST) (on file with author).
126 Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 55, at 45.
127 RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI ET AL., MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 128-29 (2001),
http://www.nycwebmail.com/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr/0901vol2.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/M5SN-7EM6].
128 ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RE-
CENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE 4-5 (2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/cb/data_brief_foster_care_trends1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBX6-
E5L8] (noting that New York City had the second largest decline in the country be-
tween 2002 and 2012).
129 MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG ET AL., MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 31-34 (2010),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr/0910_mmr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/336Z-KU2G].
130 Kathleen R. DeCataldo & Karen Carroll, Adoption Now: A Joint Initiative of New
York’s Courts and Child Welfare System, CHILD WELFARE, Mar./Apr. 2007, 31, 47-48, http:/
/www.nycourts.gov/ip/justiceforchildren/NewContent/AdoptionNow.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YXN7-K8NC].
131 Children Exiting Foster Care by Age Group: New York, KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., http:/
/datacenter.kidscount.org/data/line/6274-children-exiting-foster-care-by-age-group?
loc=1&loct=2#2/34/false/869,35,18,17,16,15,14,13,12,11/asc/2619,122/13044
[https://perma.cc/LQZ9-2AL6] (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
132 See infra text accompanying note 134.
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iders were initially granted contracts, 17,000 children were in care
for an average of 11.5 months.133 By 2012, when institutional prov-
iders were representing clients in the four largest boroughs, the
number of children had dropped to 14,000, with children averag-
ing 6.8 months in care while children of CFR clients who entered
care averaged only 2.5 months; half of the children in CFR cases
never entered foster care at all.134 In 2016, the number of children
in foster care in New York City dipped below 10,000 for the first
time.135
This does not mean that all children are better off because the
foster care population has declined; nor does it mean that the
child welfare system in New York is now working as intended.
Those are questions for another time. This essay, instead, is consid-
ering the intersection of significantly improved representation for
parents with the purpose and meaning of FCTPs as problem-solv-
ing courts. The core legal goals of both the child welfare system
generally and FCTPs are to keep children safe while seeking per-
manency for them and prioritizing permanency by keeping chil-
dren safely at home and, if that is not possible, in alternative
placements that will either lead to reunification or to another per-
manent resolution through guardianship or adoption.136 But the
methods of this multi-disciplinary representation may clash with
the paradigm of the FCTP, calling into question both the purpose
and the need of parents submitting to that far more intrusive
paradigm.
VI. IMPACT OF FAMILY DEFENSE ON FAMILY COURT TREATMENT
PARTS
Problem-solving courts have been identified as the better of
133 Andrew White et al., Homes Away From Home: Foster Parents for a New Generation,
CHILD WELFARE WATCH, Summer 2008, at 1, 2, http://docslide.us/documents/child-
welfare-watch-homes-away-from-home.html [https://perma.cc/E3K4-3XVH]; see also
BLOOMBERG ET AL., supra note 129, at 31-32 (noting that 16,854 children were in foster
care in fiscal year 2007).
134 Bach, supra note 32, at 1074; see also Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 55, at 46.
The average length of stay has increased recently to closer to 5.5 months. This is, in
part, because CFR has continued to be successful in keeping more children at home
so that the children coming into care are more likely to require more assistance and,
in part, because CFR’s caseload has aged. Email from Michele Cortese, Exec. Dir., Ctr.
for Family Representation (Dec. 2, 2016, 11:45 EST) (on file with author).
135 #NYCFamilyStrong, N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. SERVICES, http://www1.nyc.gov/
site/acs/about/Events/2016/milestones/twenty.page [https://perma.cc/J6G9-
7YRD] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
136 See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111
Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305).
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two bad options compared to the current family court, particularly
the adversarial, winner-take-all mentality that can permeate family-
related proceedings. Professor Claire Huntington has argued that
they offer real support in a collaborative process that assists fami-
lies if they are unable to secure that help before they reach the
court.137 Professor Wendy Bach has responded that turning to
problem-solving courts to enhance the “autonomy-conferring sup-
port and . . . the right to be protected against inappropriate state
action” that Huntington values is the wrong turn.138 Providing
multi-disciplinary representation instead will better accomplish
these goals that Huntington identifies.139 Bach uses CFR as an ex-
ample of how each member of the multi-disciplinary team de-
scribed in Part V works to secure the assistance a family needs while
holding the state accountable for all of their duties to the family,
including providing services that would prevent a child from being
removed from her family or return her home sooner.140 Bach
posits that the rights-based approach to child protection proceed-
ings can be the better option if done well.141 And doing it well in
New York City has eliminated the need for FCTPs.
In preparing this article, I spoke to several current and former
managerial attorneys in two of the institutional family defense prac-
tices in New York City. What follows is based on those conversa-
tions as well as a study of the Bronx FCTP from 2005-2010.142 I
think the description captures both how the FCTPs in New York
City might have remained a viable alternative for more parents if
the recommendations of the Effective Practices report had been fol-
lowed as well as how the FCTP became an unnecessary alternative
when parents are provided with the type of family defense repre-
sentation that is now afforded them in New York City.
One of the core principles of Effective Practices is to include all
of the stakeholders in the planning and implementation of the
FCTP from the beginning to permit everyone’s concerns to be
aired and to ensure that everyone is in agreement on the structure
137 Huntington, like Bach, would prefer they receive that assistance in a variety of
ways that would eliminate the need for most court proceedings. See, e.g., Clare Hunt-
ington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006); CLARE HUNTING-
TON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 137-41
(2014).
138 Bach, supra note 32, at 1073. This duty reinforces family integrity by prioritizing
family unity or reunification.
139 Id. at 1075.
140 Id. at 1073-76.
141 Id.
142 PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94.
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of the FCTP.143 The Manhattan experience of non-inclusion de-
scribed above in Part III was mirrored in the Bronx. When Bronx
Defenders began its family practice, the first attorney requested to
attend any meetings about FCTP; that request was denied.144 As the
family defense organizations grew—and especially after they re-
ceived City contracts in 2007—the organizations in the Bronx and
Manhattan began to have greater leverage and influence in the
stakeholder meetings to shape the FCTPs. At the same time, the
organizations were analyzing the process, benefits, and detriments
to their clients participating in a FCTP, particularly when resources
to the FCTPs were cut in the late 2000s.145
Counseling clients to participate in FCTP began to turn on
four intersecting factors: which judge was presiding, whether and
to what extent clients would be able to retain their due process
rights, whether the FCTP’s treatment components—including
providers and drug testers—were competent and appropriate for
the clients, and whether the client would be better off in a regular
court part with the family defense team working to secure treat-
ment and services.146 The judge’s role, both the administrative
judge and the FCTP judge, appeared to be central.147 Some judges
continued to adhere to some or all of the standard FCTP require-
ments: assessing the potential participant prior to the parent meet-
ing with counsel; requiring an admission of neglect; declining to
litigate issues of removal, visitation, or disposition; and rejecting
the possibility of a parent receiving an alternative disposition like
an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD).148 The key
issues in parent advocates’ reluctance to recommend that their cli-
ents participate in FCTP were, first, that an admission precluded
143 EFFECTIVE PRACTICES, supra note 92, at 39.
144 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97; PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94,
at 11.
145 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97; Interview with Michele Cortese, supra
note 105.
146 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97; Interview with Michele Cortese, supra
note 105; Interview with Emma Ketteringham, Managing Attorney, Family Defense
Practice, The Bronx Defenders (Mar. 28, 2016); PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note
94, at 44-45.
147 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97; Interview with Emma Ketteringham,
supra note 146; PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at vi, 45 (determining that the
presiding judge had more influence over the parent’s perception of fairness than any
other factor).
148 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97, Interview with Michele Cortese, supra
note 105; Interview with Emma Ketteringham, supra note 146; PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL.,
supra note 94, at 13, 44 (noting changes in practices that began in 2011, including
some judges permitting entrance to FCTP after a litigated fact-finding hearing and
changing some of the eligibility criteria to broaden the qualifying types of parents).
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the parent from requesting the immediate return of a removed
child and, second, that the parent’s successful completion of FCTP
could not result in a disposition that dismissed the case.149 Parents
would be subjected to more frequent and greater court supervision
without the opportunity of having their graduation from FCTP re-
sult in as good a legal outcome, such as dismissal of a case after an
ACD, as in a regular part.150 Even if some of these requirements
were waived, counsel was still concerned about the accuracy of the
drug testing (and the inability to challenge the tests), the availabil-
ity and effectiveness of the treatment providers associated with the
FCTP, the abstinence-only rather than harm-reduction approach
to treatment, and the quality of the treatment reports being sent to
the FCTP.151 Participating in FCTP also didn’t improve parent’s
access to the instrumental services they needed, like housing, em-
ployment and public benefits.152 In fact, outcomes in the Bronx
FTPC on child removal, time to permanency, and reunification
were no better than in the regular child protection parts, with time
to permanency taking considerably longer in FCTP.153 And as re-
sources were cut for the FCTPs over time, and the quality of the
resource team diminished, there was greater turnover of dedicated
staff who understood substance abuse and treatment, and the
model began to be dismantled. Across the city, responsibility for
the FCTPs was distributed among more judges; the central compo-
nent of frequent and meaningful court monitoring was harder to
maintain; in at least one New York City borough, FCTP staff were
assigned to cases in the regular court parts rather than in a special
court part; in another borough the court administers the FCTP
only intermittently. The Effective Practices guidelines were never
employed.154
The role of the family defense organizations in the demise of
the FCTP is apparent and significant. In creating effective multi-
disciplinary teams, these organizations combine successful litiga-
tion strategies with securing the treatment and resources their cli-
ents need without subjecting their clients to additional court
149 PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at 14.
150 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97.
151 Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97; Interview with Michele Cortese, supra
note 105; Interview with Emma Ketteringham, supra note 146.
152 PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at 33. This appears to be different than in
other FCTPs where services are more available and accessible. See Green et al., supra
note 109, at 56.
153 PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at iii.
154 Interview with Michele Cortese, supra note 105; Interview with Emma Kettering-
ham, supra note 146; Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97.
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 103 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 103 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY106.txt unknown Seq: 30  1-FEB-17 12:04
200 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:171
supervision and, in fact, securing better legal and permanency out-
comes. The decision to stop recommending that most of their cli-
ents participate in FCTPs was consistent with their ethical duty of
loyalty to their clients.155 While family defense advocates were
urged by the court to continue referring clients to participate, they
couldn’t justify counseling clients to participate because their pri-
mary loyalty was to their client and not to the FCTP. In the 2.5
years that NDS has represented parents in child welfare proceed-
ings in Manhattan, three clients have participated in the Manhat-
tan FCTP; the other organizations rarely identify a client who
would be better off participating in the FCTP than in a regular
court part.156
VII. LESSONS
An FCTP that is created and managed according to the Effec-
tive Practices guidelines has greater likelihood of responding to the
concerns of attorneys for parents who are reluctant to counsel
their clients to participate in a FCTP. This is, in part, because the
parent attorneys would have helped establish the rules from the
beginning; would be deeply knowledgeable about the advantages
or concerns for any particular client; would be fully participating in
all aspects of the meeting and court processes by their client’s side;
and would have the opportunity to shape the FCTP going forward.
That said, unless there are advantages to the client that outweigh
the disadvantages, a robust parent defense bar adds greater value
to maintaining family integrity than participating in a FCTP.157
Family defense practices have their own professional teams sup-
porting parents, securing treatment and other services, protecting
due process rights, and keeping or reunifying families safely and
more quickly with less court involvement and supervision. All this is
done without putting into jeopardy the loyalty central to the attor-
ney-client relationship that encourages parents to communicate
freely and honestly with their confidential trusted advisors.
155 Client loyalty requires careful adherence to confidentiality, diligence, and com-
munication with clients. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.3, 1.4, 1.6 (2013).
156 Interview with Michele Cortese, supra note 105; Interview with Emma Kettering-
ham, supra note 146; Interview with Kara Finck, supra note 97; Email from Stacy Char-
land, supra note 125; PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at 44.
157 Several of the attorneys noted that some clients respond well to constant court
monitoring and team supports but that often turns on the judge and the team. This is
consistent with the “judge effect” finding that the presiding judge has more influence
over the perceptions of the parent than whether the parent participates in the FCTP.
PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at vi, 4.
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The New York court system continues to encourage FCTPs
and FCTP practices. A committee was recently convened “to ex-
plore changes in [FCTP] policy or practice that might encourage
more parents to engage in [FCTP]” as well as to provide new think-
ing to counties “that want to infuse their non-[FCTPs] with new
routines targeted to families impacted by addiction.”158 This com-
mittee included family defense counsel, attorneys representing
state and county social services agencies and children, and court
personnel. Their recommendations capture the tensions about
FCTPs described in this essay. Members of the committee dis-
agreed about whether an admission to neglect was necessary to par-
ticipate in the FCTP; whether other due process rights, like
litigating removals or dispositions, had to be waived; the quality of
treatment and whether the best types of treatment were being con-
sidered; the appropriate role for the FCTP staff, especially their
input into non-treatment issues like child development or domes-
tic violence; and whether the FCTP team was trained and knowl-
edgeable about a range of issues including trauma-informed
practice, cultural and gender contexts, and the variety of ap-
proaches to substance use treatment. A key concern was that par-
ents would not be forthcoming about their substance use if they
did not make an admission to neglect and that the purpose of the
FCTP to focus on treatment rather than legal issues would be un-
dermined.159 The core response from parents’ attorneys was that
without the flexibility of having the ability to litigate child welfare
legal issues like removal or return home—as well as the option of
not making an admission to participate in the FCTP—and an over-
all reconsideration of types and appropriateness of treatment mo-
dalities, they could not counsel their clients to participate in
FCTP.160
The number of FCTPs in New York State has gone from a high
of 50 to half that number currently.161 In New York City, the FCTPs
are a skeleton of what they were, in large part because family de-
fense counsel will not advise their clients to participate in a process
that neither protects their due process rights nor provides them
158 ENGAGEMENT OF COUNSEL AND PARTIES SUBCOMM., RECOMMENDATIONS (2015)
(on file with CUNY Law Review).
159 Id. These disagreements were not all role-based; some county attorneys, for ex-
ample, were not opposed to FCTP participation without an admission.
160 Id.
161 PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 94, at ii; Christine Kiesel, Coordinator, N.Y.
Child Welfare Court Improvement Project, Statement at the Statewide Multidiscipli-
nary Child Welfare Work Group (Apr. 18, 2016).
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with better treatment or services than their own advocates secure
for them without being subject to intrusive monitoring and super-
vision by the court. The quality of family defense is likely to con-
tinue to improve in New York State and across the country. The
New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services has recently is-
sued Standards for Parental Representation in State Intervention Matters
and sponsored a statewide family defense conference in 2015.162
The ABA Center on Children and the Law has now embraced par-
ent representation through its National Alliance for Parent Repre-
sentation, which has sponsored four national conferences on
parent representation and recently issued Representing Parents in
Child Welfare Cases, written by the preeminent parent advocates and
scholars in the country.163 Innovative models of parent representa-
tion are being developed nationwide.164
Previously a small number of scholars warned about the dan-
gers of creating problem-solving courts like FCTPs; their warnings
did not stop the proliferation of these courts.165 Vigorous, multi-
disciplinary parent representation has protected the right of family
integrity and improved outcomes for families and children while,
in its wake, challenging the very existence of these courts.
162 STANDARDS FOR PARENTAL REPRESENTATION IN STATE INTERVENTION MATTERS
(N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS. 2015), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Pa-
rental%20Representation%20Standards%20Final%20110615.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QQ3B-J3EH]); BECAUSE ALL FAMILIES MATTER: ENHANCING PARENTAL DEFENSE IN NEW
YORK, N.Y. ST. DEFENDERS ASS’N, http://us10.campaign-archive1.com/?u=9dc0582cbff
834483f0bee296&id=5163aa54aa&e=85746d67b8 [https://perma.cc/B5B5-LA64]
(last visited Dec. 8, 2016).
163 REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAM-
ILY DEFENDERS 17 (Martin Guggenheim & Vivek S. Sankaran eds., 2015).
164 CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, SUMMARY OF PARENT REPRESENTA-
TION MODELS (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
center_on_children_and_the_law/parentrepresentation/sum-
mary_parentrep_model.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q974-WUL4].
165 See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT (2001); Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment
Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205 (1998); Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-
Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1513 (2003); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of
Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479 (2004); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I
on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37 (2001).
